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Abstract: This chapter examines the relationship between laws and mechanisms as 
approaches to characterising generalizations and explanations in science. I give an 
overview of recent historical discussions where laws failed to satisfy stringent logical 
criteria, opening the way for mechanisms to be investigated as a way to explain 
regularities in nature. This followed by a critical discussion of contemporary debates 
about the role of laws versus mechanisms in describing versus explaining regularities. I 
conclude by offering new arguments for two roles for laws that mechanisms cannot 
subsume, one epistemically optimistic and one pessimistic, both broadly Humean. Do 
note that this piece is not primarily Hume exegesis; it is more of a riff in the key of 
Hume. 
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I. Introduction 
Contemporary discussion of mechanisms sprang from many failures of laws to do what 
philosophers of science wanted them to. Yet the expectations at that time for what laws 
should be able to do were impossible to achieve. Is there still room for a better construal 
of laws in understanding explanation and the nature of the world as studied by science, or 
do mechanisms provide everything that is required for scientific explanations? How do 
genuine laws relate to mechanisms in a mechanistic worldview?  
 
After a survey of the discussion around laws and mechanisms, I offer an original 
argument for two main ways in which laws and mechanisms can relate without either 
conceptually or ontologically reducing to the other, using Hume to illustrate. The first 
connection between laws and mechanisms involves the recognition of the ‘brute’ 
character of laws, such that they can explain but are not themselves further explicable. 
This is illustrated by Hume’s skeptical realism, where the world’s hidden springs and 
secret principles are forever covered over from our epistemic access. The second 
connection between laws and mechanisms involves a unique role for laws via 
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distinctively mathematical explanations, in which laws can provide a further degree of 
necessity, via mathematics, than can any collection of mechanisms no matter how 
comprehensive. This is illustrated in terms of the evidence for such laws, which may 
include the sort Hume labeled ‘relations of ideas’, rather than solely the type of evidence 
we have for mechanisms that Hume labeled ‘matters of fact’. 
 
 
II. A short recent history of laws and mechanisms 
Mechanisms as a characteristic form of explanation were originally developed as an 
alternative to a then-dominant way of understanding explanation as necessarily involving 
laws. The deductive-nomological model of explanation stated that explanations involve 
subsuming the explanandum (that which is to be explained) under a general law. The 
explanatory work was done by the law: event A led to event B because A was an F, B 
was a G, and all F’s are G’s (e.g. Hempel 1962). The explanans derived its power from 
the nomologicity of the law that figured in it. As such, laws needed to be general, or 
ideally, universal in that they apply everywhere at all times. They also needed to be more 
than merely true descriptions of what did or will happen. They had to involve a stronger 
degree of necessity, and convey what must happen, given those laws. Nomologicity is 
thus a kind of necessity that is stronger than mere actuality – it is more than what does 
happen; and it is weaker than what is sometimes called metaphysical or logical necessity, 
which involves what must or could not happen regardless of the laws.  
 
In this potted mini-history, it is incredibly important to emphasize that the notion of laws 
that served in deductive nomological accounts of explanation were of a peculiar logical 
sort. Traditionally, laws have taken to be part of the world itself, and descriptions of those 
parts of the world yielded statements that had a special status as descriptions. The term 
'law' would be equally applied to both the features of the world being described, and to 
the description itself. For instance, in the law F=ma, force, mass, and acceleration, as well 
as the necessary relationship between them, are all part of the natural world, and are a 
special part such that learning that such a relationship among those quantities holds 
allows us to make far more predictions than we otherwise could with individual cases of 
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acceleration, mass, and force. The written mathematical form describing the relationship 
among the quantities, 'F=ma', is also called a law. As such, the term law applied to both 
the nomological features of the world and equally to the linguistic devices such as 
mathematical formulas used to describe those features of the world. 
 
Laws were taken to bear the mark of their necessity in their very syntactic structure, so 
that only the schematic structure of the law, rather than its actual content or meaning, was 
required to identify a genuine law from a merely true generalization. Much work in the 
20th century went into trying to find ways to represent laws as sentences in logical 
notation such that lawlike and non-lawlike statements were clearly differentiable by 
syntactic structure alone, without reference to actual content of the laws (e.g. Ayer 1956). 
Their idea was that laws in the world could be identified by their description. Genuine 
laws, and only laws, could be written out in logic, such that only the form of the sentence 
matter (All F’s are G’s) was required to identify such sentences as lawlike, without 
having to say anything about what the variables (the F and the G) stood for. This project 
failed, gruesomely (Goodman 1983). There is no unique logical structure of laws such 
that all and only laws, but no accidentally true generalizations such as "all the coins in my 
pocket are silver", have that structure.  
 
This failure to find some logical structure unique to laws was fruitful in generating new 
ideas about what makes laws law-like, and about other forms of explanation that don’t 
require such peculiarly structured laws nor deductive relationships. Laws in physics, even 
under best-case scenarios, do not resemble the logical creatures required for deductive-
nomological accounts (e.g. Cartwight 1983). Unification of apparently disparate 
phenomena, for instance, is a historically well-substantiated form of explanation that does 
not rely on the logical notion of laws (Kitcher 1981). Explanations in the so-called 
special sciences were noted to rarely if ever use laws of the form presumed to be found in 
physics (Fodor 1974). Many causal explanations need not ever involve such laws (e.g. 
Woodward 2005, Strevens 2006).  
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This opened the way for mechanisms to gain attention as a key form that explanations 
take in certain sciences (e.g. Bechtel and Richardson 1993). Mechanisms differ from both 
the logically distinctive but mythical creatures sought for the D-N model of explanation, 
and from the best examples of actual laws found in physics and related disciplines. 
Mechanisms can be indefinitely local, particular, and contingent. They can proliferate in 
number, rather than be eliminated via reduction. They can serve explanatory roles for 
which laws, even if they were available, would be somewhat unsatisfactory and brute 
(Andersen 2011). Some authors, such as Glennan (1996), even argued that mechanisms 
could replace the characteristic kind of nomological necessity associated with laws.  
 
It is important to recognize the heterogeneity of ‘mechanism’ in current discussions for 
reasons of clarity and philosophical precision. Some have argued that there is a growing 
consensus on the character of mechanisms (see especially the introduction to this volume, 
Ilari and Glennan). Others have argued that the situation is more of a muddle than a 
consensus, where very distinct senses of the term mechanism are used without sufficient 
care as to the differences between them (Andersen 2014a and 2014b). Minimally, there 
are relevant differences in emphasis between approaches to mechanisms. Some (e.g. 
Craver and Darden 2013) concentrate on the details of scientific practice and the role that 
mechanisms play in structuring discovery and investigation. Others (notably Glennan 
2010) generalize the notion to offer a mechanistic worldview strikingly similar to those 
of the early modern era, which is more of an alternative to atomism or process ontology 
than it is an alternative to specific explanatory practices in contemporary science. Some 
take mechanisms to involve the notion of causation (such as Bogen 2005 and Machamer 
2004) while other take mechanisms to be causation (such as Glennan 1996, or for a 
different notion of mechanism, Salmon 1998). Each of these conceptions of mechanism 
involves a different relationship to modal notions like nomologicity, which in turn 
changes the details of how such mechanisms are related to laws.  
 
In order to leave as little metaphysical space, as it were, for laws, I will take the broadest 
possible construal of mechanisms (Glennan 2010) in order to push the question of what if 
any role for laws remains in such a mechanistic worldview. In such a construal, 
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explaining the often surprisingly simple regularities in the world involves describing 
them with laws and then fleshing out laws with supporting mechanisms that explain why 
such lawfully-describable regularities hold. There are two views about the relationship 
between laws and mechanisms that might follow from this strongest construal of 
mechanism. On the first, laws are a useful step in describing regularities, but cannot be 
the last step, since laws themselves require explanation in terms of the mechanisms that 
support or sustain them. On the second view, mechanisms are a useful way to represent 
higher-level structures in the natural world, but they cannot themselves be fundamental, 
since if one were to go ‘all the way down’ with mechanisms, there would still be lawful 
connections between the elements or stages of a mechanism, such that the fundamental 
explanatory role would require laws and their nomologicity, which would remain brute in 
the sense of providing explanations but being themselves not further explicable.  
 
If we focus on physics as providing the more fundamental account of the natural world, 
laws are often taken to be required for mechanisms. If we focus on biological sciences, 
laws and mechanisms appear more like distinctive stages of discovery, investigation, then 
explanation of patterns or regularities that are identified as phenomena of interest. It is a 
difficult and sometimes underappreciated task to even locate genuine regularities and 
describe them in a sufficiently precise fashion that they might qualify as a law in the first 
place (see also Mitchell 2000). Once a given regularity is identified and then described in 
terms of a law, though, that very law is itself a target for explanation. Why does this law 
hold? What conditions give rise to or sustain the regularity? Why do the relevant 
parameters have these value ranges rather than some other value ranges? Thus, a 
difference in initial emphasis between physics versus biology can yield a difference in 
how prominent laws versus mechanisms appear in terms of explanation and 
fundamentality. 
 
 
III. Contemporary discussions of regularities, mechanisms and laws 
 The term ‘regularity’ is often used to highlight a feature of the world, so that it picks out 
regularly recurring patterns of behavior. Such regularities provide the grounds for 
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individuating phenomena for description and investigation. Using a historical example, 
there is a regularity in the way in which heavy objects’ velocities change after being 
dropped, such that Galileo labels it the Law of Odd numbers (Cohen 1985). He found a 
surprising regularity that depended only on how long the object had been falling, and not, 
for instance, on the size of the object, how large or small it was, and more. The regularity 
in question was formulated in terms of the amount by which the velocity increased 
between each time interval – it went up by 1 unit, then 3, then 5, and so on. This simple 
progression in the rate at which the velocity of dropped objects increased was surprising, 
generally observable for any object (for the right sorts of objects, anyways), and not 
merely a coincidence. The Law of Odd Numbers describes a particular regularity that we 
now know how to derive from the uniform acceleration of massive objects in a 
gravitational field. Galileo's version of the law is subsumed by Newton’s version as a 
particular case of more general laws about mass, force, and acceleration. Newton’s laws 
thus describe a different, more abstractly picked out, regularity, of which the regularity 
that Galileo described is a proper subset. 
 
This example highlights how some degree of generalizability is required in order to 
qualify as a regularity. Regularities must be at least minimally regular, holding over some 
changes in a variety of background circumstances and potentially relevant parameters. 
When scientists move from identifying an intriguing regularity and calling the resulting 
description a law, there is a commitment to the belief that the observed regularity does 
not hold merely for the circumstances already observed, but will hold for unobserved and 
future circumstances. Importantly for the connection with mechanisms, we can be very 
mathematically precise about how an object described by the Law of Odd Numbers or 
Newton's laws will accelerate by knowing only a few parameters about the strength of the 
gravitational field, and without knowing anything about the way in which a gravitational 
field brings about acceleration. Thus, laws describe regularities in a way that commits to 
a certain scope of generalizability. Laws are regularities that must hold, rather than ones 
that happen to hold. It is this necessity that makes them especially useful in explanations 
and in understanding the underlying structure of the natural world. 
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However, generalizability does not necessarily require a law. There are many regularities 
in fields such as biology, sometimes expressed in mathematical terms, that are often 
taken to be generalizable and describable in mathematically precise ways. There are 
mathematical relationships regarding the distribution of traits across generation that hold 
across species and are taken to hold into the future as well. They must hold, with the 
necessity characteristic of laws rather than of accidental generalizations Yet these 
regularities don’t seem to be part of the fundamental structure of the world; if we take 
laws to reveal the fabric of the world, then these generlizations fail to be part of it. Beatty 
(1995), for instance, has argued that if we ran the tape of evolution again, we would end 
up with a radically different outcome. Such incredible contingency seems at odds with 
the idea of lawfulness. If Beatty were right, then on the then-current understanding of 
laws, nothing in biology (or at least, no products of evolution) could be explainable by 
recourse to nomological necessity. This raised a pointed question for philosophers of 
biology about the status of generalizations in biology versus physics. 
 
Are there such regularities as would require laws in biology? And would the resulting 
laws be of the same type as what goes under the name of law in physics?  Cartwright 
(1983) has argued persuasively that even physics doesn’t have the kinds of laws for 
which philosophers of science went looking in the 20th century. Rather try to get 
biological regularities to look like laws in physics, Mitchell (1997, 2000) argues for laws 
that apply to both physics and biology. This involves rejecting the binary dichotomy 
between full laws and mere accidental generalizations. Pragmatic laws are 
generalizations that are stronger than mere accidental regularities, but not as strong as 
universal, exceptionless laws.  
 
The strength of pragmatic laws can be measured along multiple distinguishable 
dimensions. The first dimension is stability: across what range of background conditions 
and parameter values does the generalization hold? A generalization that holds under 
wider range of conditions is more stable, with the limiting ideal of the universal law that 
holds everywhere at all times. The stability of the conditions on which a law depends can 
vary, while nevertheless yielding generalizations that bear the right degree of necessity 
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under the right conditions. The second dimension is strength: how strong is the necessity 
associated with the generalization, for the conditions under which it holds? At one 
extreme is the exceptionless law, which is never violated in its domain. But there may be 
generalizations that hold almost always that are used in a lawlike way, even though there 
are exceptions to them. A third dimension is degree of abstraction. Generalizations that 
are more abstract are those that ignore more the details, to pull out some more broad 
pattern across a wider range of concrete examples. Woodward (2010) makes a very 
similar point, but leaves laws behind in favor of causal generalizations. 
 
This brings us to mechanisms. Mechanisms are often defined explicitly as providing 
explanations for regularities in nature: why those regularities occur in the conditions that 
they do, why they don’t occur under other conditions, how the underlying entities and 
activities are organized and causally connected such that they produce as a final stage or 
give rise to and sustain the observed regularity for which an explanation is sought (e.g. 
Bechtel and Richardson 1993, Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000). A model of a 
mechanism for a given regularity may provide the ability to make predictions about what 
would happen under new conditions. 
 
This highlights one complementary role that laws and mechanisms can play in science. 
While laws describe regularities, mechanisms may go further and explain them. It is a 
difficult, and often underappreciated, task to precisely describe a regularity. Finding the 
right variables, the right way to relate them, and the right way to delineate the conditions 
of application, in the form of a law that is both accurate and can be used to make precise 
predictions, is itself a major scientific achievement. To say that laws describe regularities 
is not to diminish the work that laws can do. The task of describing via a law is not 
trivial; it is a huge breakthrough that is often itself a prerequisite for further work on that 
phenomenon. Investigations into the mechanisms responsible for a lawful regularity can 
yield the mechanisms that sustain, produce, or give rise to the regularity. Mechanisms 
explain why that regularity holds as it does, and how it is that instances of that regularity 
occur when and how they do. 
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It is vital to note that there need not be one mechanism = one law equivalence. Multiple 
distinct kinds of mechanisms may give rise to one lawful regularity. It might be that a 
particular law, as the precise description of a recurrent regularity that involves some 
degree of necessity, holds because of several distinct mechanisms operating under 
different circumstances. Conversely, there may be many different laws that turn out to 
involve the same underlying mechanism in different contexts.  Maxwell's laws illustrate 
both directions of this. According to Morrison (2007), the formalism Maxwell used 
allowed him to provide quite general laws without specifying the variety of physical 
causes that might be involved in any given instance to which the laws apply allowing for 
multiple mechanisms underlying one law. At the same time, Maxwell's laws unified 
apparently disparate phenomena of electricity and magnetism, such that several older 
laws could be subsumed in terms of unified mechanisms of electromagnetism (e.g. p. 64). 
 
Regularity can mean recurrent patterns of behavior that can be identified as phenomena 
of interest. There are also further notions of regularity that appears in discussions of 
mechanisms, focused on how tightly bound the stages of a mechanism are in order to 
count as a mechanism. Bogen (2005) has argued that regularity should not be a 
requirement on counting as a mechanism. Machamer, Darden, and Craver define 
mechanisms specifically in terms of regularity. "Mechanisms are regular in that they 
work always or for the most part in the same way under the same conditions." (200, p. 3) 
Bogen argues that there are mechanisms (or, what ought to count as mechanisms) that do 
not meet the requirement of “almost or for the most part”.  
 
Bogen invokes the example of the release of neurotransmitter vesicles given the 
stimulation of the neuron. Only about 10% of vesicles, in the right start-up conditions, 
actually release neurotransmitter. According to the MDC definition, the case should not 
count as a mechanism, since the “always or for the most part” condition is not met. Yet 
this release is still a key part in the mechanism for transmitting a signal across the 
synapse. How tightly bound together must a series of causal processes be in order to 
count as a mechanism, rather than a mere coincidental collection of nearby interactions? 
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Bogen’s aim is to push us towards a lower degree of regularity, such that the 10% counts 
as regular enough under the circumstances.  
 
It is helpful to distinguish two possible loci of regularity at issue here: the degree to 
which a regularity exists in the world, as a phenomenon that could stand as the target of 
explanation; versus the degree of regularity within the mechanisms that explains such a 
phenomenon, where different organizations stages might have different probabilistic 
degrees of connection. I have responded (2012) to Bogen’s challenge by arguing that 
mechanisms must be considered as at least minimally regular, in the sense of not being 
one-off causal chains, in order to be the target of scientific (rather than historical, for 
instance) explanation. If mechanisms are to do explanatory work for individual 
occurrences of a mechanism, it must be by dint of situating that individual instance as a 
member of a type of occurrence. A taxonomy of different degrees of regularity, and 
locations different organizational stages of the mechanism, can convey a great deal of 
information about mechanism(s), and provide additional phenomena requiring further 
explanation. For example, the 10% figure for vesicle neurotransmitter release is part of a 
larger, embedding mechanism that essentially uses the 10% rate to calibrate 
neurotransmitter to reduce noisy synapse firings. Thus, the purportedly irregular 10% 
release rate is a consistent regularity in the other sense, that of a recurrent pattern of 
behavior requiring explanation for which a mechanism can be sought. 
 
Notice how important the issue of generalization has been for construing the relationship 
between mechanisms and regularities. The very idea of a regularity contains within the 
notion of recurrence: a singular event, that will only happen once, cannot be a regularity, 
and thus cannot be explained as a regularity. Insofar as it is situated within a group of 
other possible instances, even if they are only merely possible instances, it is already 
being treated as a kind of regularity.  
 
Thus far, the relationships between laws and mechanisms has been more complementary 
than competitive. There is one contemporary debate that does pitch mechanisms amd 
laws as competitors in the explanation business. A mechanism can explain why a law 
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holds, and a law can connect the stages within a mechanism. Which is more explanatorily 
fundamental, mechanisms or laws? Suppose some regularity is identified and described 
as lawful. Further investigation turns up a mechanism that explains how that lawful 
regularity holds. But this mechanism is comprised of organized entities and processes 
that are themselves lower level lawful regularities. The mechanism that explained the 
original law requires further laws for its own operation. And each such law might be 
further explained by a mechanism, and the stages of that mechanism must involve laws to 
connect them, and so on downwards.  
 
Where does this end? There are two main options. It could terminate with laws of physics 
at the most fundamental levels, such that there are no further mechanisms that could be 
posited to underlie the laws. They would be brute, in that they could explain but not be 
themselves explained; they would simply hold of the world. On the other option, even the 
laws of physics could themselves be mechanistically explained, such that mechanisms 
would be ontologically and explanatorily fundamental.  
 
This framing of the question has several notable features, regardless of the eventual 
answer. The first is that it emphasizes the ontological or even metaphysical aspects of the 
question. It is not merely a question of what explains what. The explanatory 
consequences follow from ontological priority. A second feature is that the framing 
presupposes that either laws, or mechanisms, but not both, are ontologically primitive. 
This puts laws and mechanisms in a kind of explanatory competition, where it must be 
the same explananda that both endeavor to explain, but where there is only room for one 
genuine explanation, and only these two options on the table. A third feature is that it 
lacks criteria by which this question would be adjudicated. If string theory, for instance, 
turns out to provide the material for a grand unified theory, are the core features of the 
world that it postulates mechanisms or laws? How much change to the notion of 
mechanism would be required to accommodate such a heavily mathematical theory? At 
some point of stretching the meaning of mechanism to fit mathematical models, it simply 
can’t be the same kind of mechanisms as are posited to explain the firing of a synapse 
(although a different conclusion is reached by Kuhlamnn and Glennan 2014) . 
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Finally, raising the question in terms of laws versus mechanisms elides the issue of 
causation versus mechanisms, or even in terms of nonmechanistic causation versus 
mechanistic causation. Mechanisms and counterfactuals are also taken to be opposing 
potentially ultimate categories (see especially Psillos 2004, Bogen 2005, Machamer 
2004, Woodward 2005, Glennan 2010, and chapters 10 and 11 in this volume). The 
opposition is strikingly similar: counterfactuals govern the relationships between 
elements or stages in a mechanism, but those counterfactuals can be cashed out with yet-
lower level mechanisms, and so on. 
 
In these discussions of regularities, there is a kind of modal bump in the rug. This bump 
is the ‘oomph’ that has been associated with causation, or the nomologicity that has been 
associated with laws, or the intricate architecture of a mechanism. The bump in the rug 
can be shifted, depending on other philosophical considerations, to be located at laws, 
causation, or mechanisms, but it has proven remarkably hard to just stomp it flat. When 
some regularity holds and we have reason to think that it would hold if poked and 
prodded in various ways, we need a way to capture the extra content that goes above and 
beyond merely describing what actually happened. This is not a merely semantic point: if 
some particular event really did have to happen a certain way, rather than merely 
happening to happen, leaving that out would be an incomplete description. Insofar as 
science is in the business of working towards not merely accurate but also complete 
descriptions of various parts of the natural world, it must be able to note these modal 
characteristics in a way that accurately portrays the degree of connection.  
 
Where Mitchell offered pragmatic laws to do this work in fields such as biology, others 
such as Woodward (2010) offer very similar considerations, including scope, specificity, 
and stability, for causal generalizations in biology. Cartwright (2002) notes how 
discussions of explanation and scientific theories tried to eschew talk of causation by 
using talk of laws, and how that pendulum has now swung back to causation. Lewis’ 
account of causation is based on regularities; Salmon’s is based on mechanisms. Glennan 
(1996) also turns to mechanisms for causation. 
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There is an incredibly close link between laws and causation as the two leading 
candidates to account for the degree of connection or necessity beyond mere accident that 
we find in many of the most interesting generalizations in the sciences. We can attribute 
this necessity to causation, and cash it out one way, or to laws, and cash it out a different 
way. In this regard, either laws or causation, but not both, are required. This is not a 
tension per se, in that it needn’t mean that only one of laws or causation are required (for 
instance, the idea of causal capacities or powers involve both, see chapter 10). But it 
tends to go along with relying on one or the other to do the work of accounting for 
necessity and connection. 
 
 
IV. Two Humean roles for laws 
We've now explored several subtle connections between laws and mechanisms as ways 
of explaining regularities in the world that bear some degree of necessity. In this section, 
I will lay out a schematic argument for two roles unique to laws that cannot be 
assimilated to mechanisms. Taking the broadest possible construal of mechanisms, and 
the weak construal of laws, consider: can mechanisms, if construed maximally broadly, 
do all the work that we wanted from laws, or is there still a role left for laws no matter 
how broadly one construes mechanism? This question is both perennial, in that it has 
arisen in a number of forms in philosophy since the early modern period, and Humean, in 
that it often arises anew in discussions of well-loved passages from Hume. I rely on 
Hume as a springboard for making the case for two new ways in which laws and 
mechanisms could relate, since both appear in his work. This is not Hume exegesis: I take 
it that no unambiguous answer can be given to the question of what Hume himself would 
actually say. Instead, this is a riff on Humean-style answers as a way of illustrating the 
point. 
 
As Beebee (2006) has persuasively argued, there are at least two viable ways of 
understanding what Hume says about causation, and no further definitive answers about 
which is what he ‘really’ meant (if we are even willing to assume Hume had a single 
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consistent view across all his writings). One interpretation developed by Beebee is that 
Hume was a skeptical realist. The secret connection, which might bind cause and effect 
or primary and secondary quality, the connection that is tracked by the idea of force and 
purportedly conveys necessity along its chain – to a skeptical realist, such a secret 
connection exists, but the world is such that we are in principle barred from ever gaining 
genuine epistemic access to it. It exists, but we can’t know it.  
 
It is confessed, that the utmost effort of human reason is to reduce the principles, 
productive of natural phenomena, to a greater simplicity, and to resolve the many 
particular effects into a few general causes, by means of general reasonings from 
analogy, experience, and observation. But as to the causes of these general causes, 
we should in vain attempt their discovery; nor shall we ever be able to satisfy 
ourselves by any particular explication of them. These ultimate springs and 
principles and totally shut up from human curiousity and enquiry. (Hume [1748] 
2007, p.) 
 
To the skeptical realist, laws may serve as the “the few general causes”, the most general 
explanation that science may reach. These laws describe the phenomena that are 
produced by the “ultimate springs and principles”. Yet the springs and ultimate principles 
themselves, the mechanisms producing those laws, is “totally shut up” from our 
investigations, off limits to knowledge. 
 
In other passages, Hume denies that any amount of knowledge of what we would now 
call mechanisms is sufficient to discern what might happen with further instances prior to 
actual observation.  
 
Our senses inform us of the colour, weight, and consistence of bread; but neither 
sense nor reason can ever inform us of those qualities which fit it for the 
nourishment and support of a human body…. 
The bread, which I formerly eat, nourished me; that is, a body of such sensible 
qualities was, at that time, endued with such secret powers: but does it follow, that 
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other bread must also nourish me at another time, and that like sensible qualities 
must always be attended with like secret powers? The consequence seems nowise 
necessary. (Hume [1748] 2007, pp. 33.) 
 
Students encountering this passage for the first time often wonder what Hume would say 
in the face of modern science. Once we know the mechanisms by which chemicals 
interact with the microscopic processes in our digestive tracts, wouldn’t we know 
whether a new piece of bread, or even an entirely new foodstuff given straight to 
scientists before eating, would harm us or nourish us? There is an intuitive appeal to the 
idea that this is a problem on which actual progress has been made by science – the secret 
powers of food are not so secret anymore. 
 
But Hume himself considers this question. Experience has led us to understand some 
mechanisms about nourishment, certainly; but even those rest on further sensible qualities 
that ultimately must be supported by the hidden powers and secret connections that Hume 
is challenging. Food science merely defers the problem. It does not and cannot solve it. 
 
One needn’t even commit to the realist part of skeptical realism, leaving laws as sheerly 
brute. If there are no such hidden springs, the result is still skepticism that precludes any 
possible mechanistic explanation of laws. Thus, the first Humean role for laws is an 
especially poignant one. It allows for the possibility that there are mechanisms 
underneath the fabric of the universe, and it is these mechanisms that give the modal 
oomph to those laws by providing the secret connection. Yet they remain out of reach, if 
they even exist. The laws that are the last description of regularity before those hidden 
springs will remain brute, in that they can explain, but cannot be themselves explained. 
Even in the face of massive amounts of contemporary human knowledge of mechanisms, 
these ultimate regularities cannot be assimilated to them.  
 
The second Humean role for laws that cannot be assimilated to mechanisms stems from 
the evidence for relations of ideas versus for matters of fact. The first role for laws, just 
discussed, is squarely within the realm of matters of fact: facts about regularities that are 
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described lawfully, resolved into mechanisms, but ultimately come up against the opacity 
of the hidden springs. The second role for laws involves their status as mathematical 
relationships that fall at least partially under the category of relations of ideas and thus 
have additional evidentiary support compared to matters of fact 
 
Hume very famously distinguishes between knowledge in terms of the target of inquiry.  
 
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may be naturally divided into two 
kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of fact. Of the first kind are the 
sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation 
which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain. ..Matters of fact, which are 
the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in the same way; nor is 
our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. The 
contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a 
contradiction… (Hume [1748] 2007, p. 25) 
 
He considers the kind of evidence we could have for the truth or falsity for claims about 
matters of fact versus relations of ideas Since the contrary of any factual claim is not 
contradictory, we cannot use contradiction as a guide to truth and falsity for these claims, 
but must rely on evidence of the senses. “All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem 
to be founded on the relation of Cause and Effect. By means of that relation alone we can 
go beyond the evidence of our memory and senses” (ibid, p. 70) And of course, reasoning 
based on cause and effect is ultimately founded on sheer habit. It is in this gap between 
what we infer about matters of fact, and that from which we infer it, that Humean 
skepticism arises. 
 
In contrast, relations of ideas have an entirely different evidentiary status. They do not 
ultimately rest on mere habit. They do not admit of the skepticism about knowledge to 
which matters of fact are subject. Claims about relations of ideas can be known with 
certainty and assurance, because their contraries are contradictions and therefore 
impossible. The claim I am offering here is that there is at least the possibility for 
	 17	
mathematical laws to have some evidential support that is of the form for relations of 
ideas, and thus not reducible to mechanisms (do note this is an original argument about 
how to apply this distinction to laws, not a existing view in Humean scholarship). 
 
Consider laws that are formulated mathematically (setting aside non-mathematical laws 
for now). Laws that are supported by evidence that is at least partially mathematical in 
character will have a different status than those based purely on matters of fact, even if 
the other part of the evidential support is drawn from matters of fact. Laws can be used in 
ways that rely on their mathematical features to draw conclusions that involve a markedly 
higher degree of necessity that mere nomologicity can convey, even though those same 
laws, used some other way, behave in a traditional way, conveying nomological but not 
mathematical necessity (for instance, see Lange 2013 and Andersen 2016).  
 
Consider what “relations of ideas” evidence might be available for a candidate 
mathematical law. Insofar as a law is derived from other mathematical laws, plus 
additional mathematical machinery, some of the evidence for the new law taking the form 
that it does is drawn from those mathematical relationships. Not all of the evidence for 
such a law is. Any law with genuine physical content will require at least some evidence 
of matters of fact. The point I want to make is that some of those laws may also have 
additional evidentiary support from relations of ideas, and that such additional support is 
not even potentially available for mechanisms. 
 
An intriguing potential example of this is leading versions of string theory, where this 
second Humean role for laws can account for why string theory is even being pursued as 
a viable physical theory depiste the well-known lack of empirical confirmation. There is 
widespread agreement that string theory is not supported by empirical evidence, since it 
is extraordinarily difficult to even find ways to derive empirical predictions from it. In 
other words, string theory lacks evidence of matters of fact. Why is it even being 
considered as a potential theory, much less a fundamental one? The mathematical 
structures themselves, and the ways in which some mathematical relationships emerge as 
lawfully governing any such structure in the world, provide the kind of evidence that 
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physicists find sufficiently compelling to continue working on it. This evidence is in the 
category of relations of ideas.  
 
There is thus a philosophically pessimistic and a philosophically optimistic role for laws 
to play that cannot be assimilated to mechanisms, no matter how broadly construed. Each 
of these two roles have a distinctively Humean flavor. Pessimistically, laws might be 
brute and not further explicable; we can never know if mechanisms behind those laws 
even exist, much less what they are. Optimistically, laws can play a unique role by dint of 
mathematical relationships: this yields mathematical necessity as part of the nomologicity 
of laws, and an additional potential source of evidence, relations of ideas, that is not 
susceptible to inductive skepticism. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
It is helpful in many contemporary discussions involving laws, mechanisms, regularities, 
and even causation, to consider the recent trajectory of these ideas since the mid-20th 
century. The idea of a law was supposed to do an enormous amount of work in the 
development and use of scientific theories. Peculiarities in views about the nature of 
language painted philosophers into a corner. Laws were expected to shoulder the burden 
of explanation and to clarify nomologicity in logical terms. This impossible task failed, in 
interesting ways, not least of which was that it cleared the ground for mechanisms to 
surge as a locus of research for philosophers of science trying to capture the investigatory 
and explanatory practices of sciences like biology. 
 
Yet alternative construals of laws, including but not limited to Mitchell’s pragmatic laws, 
continue to offer something unique in terms of capturing the right degree of necessity 
associated with many scientific claims. I have argued here for two new ways to think 
about the relationship between mechanisms and laws. One is pessimistically Humean, 
where there may or may not be ultimate mechanisms under the very fabric of the universe 
which give rise to the laws, but which, if they even exist, are in principle locked away 
	 19	
from us. The second is optimistically Humean, where mathematically formulated laws 
can offer a way to evade inductive skepticism at least partially, by relying on evidence 
drawn from mathematics, or, from the relations of ideas rather than matters of fact.  
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